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Ben Laurie blathering

16 Aug 2010

It’s All About Blame

Filed under: Anonymity, Crypto, Privacy, Security — Ben @ 17:57

I do not represent my employer in this post.

Eric Schmidt allegedly said

“The only way to manage this is true transparency and no anonymity. In a world of asynchronous threats, it is too dangerous for there not to be some way to identify you. We need a [verified] name service for people. Governments will demand it.”

I don’t care whether he actually said it, but it neatly illustrates my point. The trouble with allowing policy makers, CEOs and journalists define technical solutions is that their ability to do so is constrained by their limited understanding of the available technologies. At Google (who I emphatically do not represent in this post), we have this idea that engineers should design the systems they work on. I approve of this idea, so, speaking as a practising engineer in the field of blame (also known as security), I contend that what Eric really should have allegedly said was that the only way to manage this is true ability to blame. When something goes wrong, we should be able to track down the culprit. Governments will demand it.

Imagine if, the next time you got on a plane, instead of showing your passport, you instead handed over an envelope with a fancy seal on it, containing your ID, with windows showing just enough to get you on the plane (e.g. your ticket number and photo). The envelope could be opened on the order of a competent court, should it turn out you did something naughty whilst travelling, but otherwise you would remain unidentified. Would this not achieve the true aim that Eric allegedly thinks should be solved by universal identification? And is it not, when spread to everything, a better answer?

Of course, in the physical world this is actually quite hard to pull off, tamper-proof and -evident seals being what they are (i.e. crap), but in the electronic world we can actually do it. We have the crypto.

Just sayin’.

14 Aug 2010

FreeBSD Capsicum

Filed under: Capabilities, Security — Ben @ 12:34

I mentioned FreeBSD Capsicum in my roundup of capability OSes earlier this year without mentioning that I am involved in the project. Since then we’ve managed to port and sandbox Chromium, using less code than any other Chromium sandbox (100 lines), as well as a number of other applications. Also impressive, I think, is the fact that Robert Watson managed to write this sandbox in just two days, having never seen the Chromium codebase before – this is as much a testament to Robert’s coding skills and the clean Chromium codebase as it is to Capsicum, but nevertheless worth a mention.

Anyway, at USENIX Security this week, we won Best Student Paper. A PC member described the paper to me as “excellent” and “very important”. Robert has also blogged about it rather more eloquently than I can manage at this time in the morning.

You can read the paper, too, if you want.

Even more exciting, FreeBSD 9 will include the Capsicum capability framework, allowing the peaceful coexistence of capability and POSIX programs. Although this has been attempted before, as far as I am aware all previous versions have put a POSIX emulation layer on top of a capability system, rather than grafting capabilities onto POSIX. Since Capsicum is highly efficient and FreeBSD is a perfectly sound and portable system (and my server OS of choice), this opens up the possibility of a gradual migration to capabilities, something that has been problem up to now.

Robert and I (and a host of others) are continuing our research into practical capability systems, Robert at Cambridge and me at Google. Work is also in progress to port Capsicum to Linux.

26 Jun 2010

Nigori Update

Filed under: Nigori — Ben @ 15:33

It’s been a while (I’ve been busy on another project, more on that soon, I hope), but finally…

I’ve updated the protocol slightly to correct a subtle bug in the secret splitting specification. You can find the latest versions and diffs here.

I’ve also finally got around to tidying the code up some (though there’s still plenty more to do), you can find an appspot server, a command line client and various libraries, all in Python, at nigori.googlecode.com. As always, patches are welcome!

The code does not fully reflect the draft protocol yet – in particular, it still uses a Schnorr signature where the draft calls for DSA.

If you want to play with the command-line client, I already have a server running on appspot. Here’s how … from the client directory, run

$ ./client.sh nigori-server.appspot.com 80 register name password
200 OK

$ ./client.sh nigori-server.appspot.com 80 authenticate name password
200 OK

Replaying: this should fail
401 Unauthorized

$ ./client.sh nigori-server.appspot.com 80 add user password name secret
/usr/local/lib/python2.6/site-packages/Crypto/Util/randpool.py:40: RandomPool_DeprecationWarning: This application uses RandomPool, which is BROKEN in older releases.  See http://www.pycrypto.org/randpool-broken
  RandomPool_DeprecationWarning)
200 OK
Status: 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Cache-Control: no-cache
Expires: Fri, 01 Jan 1990 00:00:00 GMT
Content-Length: 0

$ ./client.sh nigori-server.appspot.com 80 get user password name
0 at 1277559350.600000: secret

Not the most elegant interface in the world. Note that the server is experimental, I may break it, delete all the data, etc. Of course, you can run your own.

Note also that the whole protocol is experimental at this point, I wouldn’t rely on it to store your vital passwords just yet!

9 Jun 2010

TLS Renegotiation, 7 Months On

Filed under: General, Security — Ben @ 9:18

It’s been 7 months since the TLS renegotiation problem went public and Opera’s security group have a couple of interesting articles about it. The first is about adoption of patched versions and the verdict is not good, as this graph shows…

Only 12% of servers are patched.

At this rate it will be two years before the fix is widely adopted!

The second is about version intolerance – scarily, nearly 90% of patched servers will not work when a future version of TLS bumps the major version number to 4 (it is currently 3). This is pretty astonishingly crap, and is likely to cause us problems in the future, so I’m glad the Opera guys are working hard to track down the culprits.

By the way, at least according to Opera, OpenSSL does not have this problem.

8 Jun 2010

XAuth: Who Should Know What?

Filed under: Anonymity, Privacy, Security — Ben @ 11:26

Note that I am not speaking for my employer in this post.

I’ve been following the debate around XAuth with interest. Whilst the debate about whether centralisation is an acceptable stepping stone to an in-browser service is interesting, I am concerned about the functionality of either solution.

As it stands, XAuth reveals to each relying party all of my identity providers, so that it can then present UI to allow me to choose one of them to authenticate to the RP. Why? What business of the RP is it where I have accounts? All that should be revealed is the IdP I choose to reveal (if any). This seems easy enough to accomplish, even in the existing centralised version: all that has to happen is for the script that xauth.org serves is to include the UI for IdP choice.

This is not just privacy religion (or theatre): as the EFF vividly illustrated with their Panopticlick experiment, it is surprisingly easy to uniquely identify people from signals you would have thought were not at all identifying, such as browser version and configuration information. Indeed, a mere 33 IdPs would provide enough information (if evenly distributed) to uniquely identify every person in the world. Meebo had no difficulty at all coming up with 15 of them for page one of many in their introductory blog post

15 IdPs on page 1 of many

23 May 2010

Nigori: Protocol Details

As promised, here are the details of the Nigori protocol (text version). I intend to publish libraries in (at least) C and Python. At some point, I’ll do a Stupid version, too.

Comments welcome, of course, and I should note that some details are likely to change as we get experience with implementation.

18 May 2010

Nigori: Storing Secrets in the Cloud

Filed under: Crypto, Nigori, Security — Ben @ 18:27

Lately, I’ve been thinking about phishing. Again. If we want users to take our sensible advice and use different passwords everywhere, then they’ve got to be able to remember those passwords and move them from machine to machine. In order to do that with any ease, we’ve got to store them in the cloud. But the question is, how to do that securely?

So, that’s what I’ve been working on for a while, and the result is Nigori, a protocol and open source implementation for storing secrets in the cloud. It doesn’t require you to trust anyone (other than your completely insecure client, of course … I’m working on that, too). The storage server(s) are incapable of getting hold of the keying material, and if you want you can use splits to ensure that individual servers can’t even attack the encrypted secrets.

Of course, Nigori isn’t just for passwords, you could also use it to store private keys and the like. For example, Salmon can use it to store signing keys.

The source is in a bit of a state right now, following some hack’n’slay related to appspot’s crypto … oddities, but I’ll post about that soon. For now, in case you missed it above, here’s an overview document.

25 Apr 2010

Wikileaks: The Facts

Filed under: Anonymity, Civil Liberties — Ben @ 18:17

Apparently some reporters think it’s useful to make stupid claims about Wikileaks. I won’t bother to link, but just in case you mistook them for journalism: for the record, I am a member of Wikileaks’ advisory board and I am honoured to be. I don’t think Julian Assange is crazy, I think he’s a very talented guy. Yeah, he’s a little unusual, but that just adds to the fun. It is true, however, that I don’t know anything about how Wikileaks operates in detail and it is also true that I think that’s a good idea.

If you don’t know what I’m talking about, I hear there’s a search engine that might help. Or you could do something useful with your time.

27 Mar 2010

Capability Operating Systems

Filed under: Caja, Capabilities, Security — Ben @ 16:31

Now that we’ve deployed the most successful capability language ever, it’s time to start thinking about the rest of the stack, and one end of that stack is the operating system.

Luckily, thinking in this area has been going on a long time – indeed, capabilities were invented in the context of the OS, though for a long time were thought to be the exclusive domain of specialised hardware. Some of that hardware ended up being extremely widely deployed, too, so don’t think this is the stuff of lab experiments only. Sadly, though, despite the hardware supported capabilities, these were not generally exposed up to the level of the kernel/userland interface; they were thought to be useful only within the kernel (with one notable, but not very well known or widely used, exception),

However, more recently it has been realised that capabilities are not only useful in userland, but also can be implemented on top of commodity hardware, resulting in a crop of new capability operating systems. But these still suffer from the problems that traditional capability languages have suffered from: they need the world to be completely reinvented before you can use them. Because the capability paradigm is fundamentally different from the ambient authority ACL-based world we live in, no existing software can fully enjoy the benefits of capabilities without at least some rewriting.

So, the interesting research question has now become: how can we move toward this world without having to rewrite everything on day one? Some progress has been made with mapping POSIX onto capabilities. Heading in a completely different direction is the idea of running existing OSes as guests on a capability system. Yet another approach is to apply capabilities to more restricted domains: one that I have been involved in is the idea of hosting untrusted software “in the cloud”, in the same vein as Google App Engine. Because this software is all new, changing the way it has to work is not a big deal.

But the thing that interests me most is the work being done on FreeBSD, which allows capability-based code to coexist with (or even be contained within) existing POSIX code. This provides a genuine, believably workable, migration path from existing systems to a brave new capability world. We can move one application (or even one library) at a time, without breaking anything. Which is why I am pleased to be able to say I am involved in this work, too. What’s even better is this work is by no means specific to FreeBSD – the same principles could be applied to any POSIX system (so Linux and Mac OS X would be good targets). Just as we have seen success with Caja it seems to me that this route can deliver success at the OS level, because it allows a gradual, piecemeal migration.

Unusually for me, I have not interrupted my narrative flow by naming or saying too much directly about the various things I link to – however, I appreciate that following links in the middle of reading can get distracting, so here are many of the links again with some explanation…

Caja: a capability version of Javascript. I have written about it before.

CAP computer: the project that invented capabilities.

IBM System/38: more capability hardware.

AS/400: derived from the System/38. Although this had capabilities, they were not exposed to userland. Very widely used commercially.

KeyKOS: a commercial capability operating system.

Amoeba: an experimental capability system – like Caja, it tends to advertise its other virtues rather than describing itself as a capability system.

EROS: another experimental capability OS – originally intended to provide robustness, not security. The first to run on a standard PC.

CapROS: when EROS was discontinued, it lived on as CapROS. Google has recently sponsored the development of a web-hosting experiment on top of CapROS.

Coyotos: by the original designer of EROS. Now also discontinued (can you spot a trend here?).

Plash: the Principle of Least Authority Shell. This shell runs on Linux, figures out from the command line what any particular invocation of an executable should have access to, creates a sandbox with access to only those things, then maps POSIX calls onto the sandboxed things.

L4: a modern capability-based microkernel.

L4Linux: Linux running on top of L4. Although this is nice for things like driver isolation, it seems like the wrong direction because it does not assist with exposing capabilities to userland.

FreeBSD Capsicum: a capability mode for FreeBSD. Whole executables can opt in to this mode, coexisting with POSIX binaries. Even more interestingly, libraries can spawn off capability-mode subprocesses whilst effectively remaining in POSIX mode themselves. This allows the transparent implementation of privilege separation. This project has also been sponsored by Google.

20 Mar 2010

Caja on Orkut

Filed under: Caja, Open Source, Security — Ben @ 18:19

If you’ve been living in a box for the last couple of years, you might not know that Caja is an open source project I am involved in at Google to make the web safer. Specifically, it allows untrusted Javascript, HTML and CSS to be sandboxed in a very fine-grained way. For example, the untrusted content can be limited to a subset of the whole DOM, primordial objects can be replaced or removed, properties of objects can be protected (from read, write or execution) and any method can be removed, replaced or attenuated. Yet it is still possible to write fully-featured Javascript applications in Caja. And, as a bonus, Caja hides the differences between browsers – any code you write will Just Work on any supported browser.

Caja has long been used by Yahoo!, ironically, to protect users from malicious gadgets on their Application Platform but until recently has been a bit of a poor relative at Google. So, I’m pleased to report that it is now in use to protect Orkut users.

Because Caja is open source, we don’t necessarily find out when people use it: do you know of someone using Caja? Leave a comment!

4 Mar 2010

Selective Disclosure, At Last?

Filed under: Anonymity, Crypto, Privacy, Security — Ben @ 5:34

Apparently it’s nearly five years since I first wrote about this and now it finally seems we might get to use selective disclosure.

I’m not going to re-iterate what selective disclosure is good for and apparently my friend Ben Hyde has spared me from the need to be cynical, though I think (I am not a lawyer!) he is wrong: the OSP applies to each individual specification – you are not required to use them in the context of each other.

So, for now, I will just celebrate the fact that Microsoft has finally made good on its promise to open up the technology, including BSD-licensed code. Though I guess I will have to inject one note of cynicism: a quick glance at the specification (you can get it here) suggests that they have only opened up the most basic use of the technology: the ability to assert a subset of the signed claims. There’s a lot more there. I hope they plan to open that up, too (how long will we have to wait, though?).

25 Feb 2010

Trust and Vulnerability

Filed under: Security — Ben @ 16:02

Ed Felten has a nice post about the crazy idea that someone can decide for us which CAs are trusted. He correctly points out that we conflate two meanings of the word “trust”, but then proposes to fix it by using the word slightly differently, for example:

“CNNIC is a trusted certificate authority.”

versus

“Everyone trusts CNNIC to be a certificate authority.”

I’ve long advocated instead saying “is vulnerable to”, which makes it much clearer what is going on, so I would say “CNNIC is a certificate authority everyone is vulnerable to”. “Trusted third party” would become “Third party you are vulnerable to” and so on. Kinda clunky, but you know where you stand.

A historical note: I believe I came up with this in one of my very first conversations with Jon Shapiro and Mark Miller about the nature of “trust” in distributed computer systems – a word that really should not be used at all in that context, I believe.

24 Feb 2010

Stupid Mailing List

Filed under: Open Source, Programming, Security — Ben @ 12:49

It seems Stupid just won’t go away – Ben Clifford and I have been gradually expanding it – it now has functions and even primitive I/O. I’m working on a new test harness and we have regular discussions on language philosophy. So I figured it was time for a mailing list for developers (and other interested parties). Here it is.

7 Feb 2010

Perhaps Not So Stupid, After All?

Filed under: Crypto, Open Source, Programming — Ben @ 17:04

Stupid now generates correct (single-block, still) SHA-256 code in C. It has functions. We’re starting to wonder about adding structures, and the semantics of arrays – particularly whether an array passed for output can also be used for input (or vice versa). I’m inclining towards making that illegal – if you want a function that, say, fills in every second entry in an array, then you’d need to pass in the array to be filled in, and return a second array which would be the result. The function would have to copy the input array to the output before filling in the new values (or copy the parts it isn’t going to fill in). It seems to me this makes analysis simpler, but can easily be optimised by smart compilers, too.

I guess its time we started writing some of this down! I’d also like to add generators for some common scripting languages, like Perl, Python and PHP.

The thing I’m a little scared of is that eventually, if I’m going to take this seriously, we’re going to need a bignum implementation – not too hard to do if you don’t care about efficiency, I guess.

30 Jan 2010

Stupid Haskell, Google Code

Filed under: Crypto, Open Source, Security — Ben @ 16:40

I can see the amusement I can derive from Stupid is going to be endless. If somewhat stupid.

More seriously, Ben Clifford wrote a Haskell plugin for Stupid. So, with his permission, I have added it to the source. I’ve also created a Google Code site for it – sadly someone already has stupid.googlecode.com, so you’ll find it at stupid-crypto.googlecode.com.

Ben also added a lot of test cases, which I haven’t yet pulled in because I want to move them into their own directory, but they may be there by the time you check the code out.

I still haven’t got around to testing the SHA-256 implementation, either. One day! Oh, and it seems the Haskell breaks, which may well be my fault. But I don’t really understand Haskell, so I might find it hard to fix.

Verified by Visa, Again

Filed under: Security — Ben @ 16:29

Not exactly news, but those clever chaps at Cambridge have a nice writeup of the problems in Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode. Short, too. Worth a read.

24 Jan 2010

Stupid: A Metalanguage For Cryptography

Filed under: Crypto, General, Open Source, Programming, Security — Ben @ 20:32

Various threads lately have got me thinking about implementing cryptography and cryptographic protocols. As I have mentioned before, this is hard. But obviously the task itself is the same every time, by its very nature – if I want to interoperate with others, then I must implement effectively the same algorithm as them. So why do we ever implement anything more than once? There are various reasons, varying as to their level of bogosity. Here’s a few

  • Trust: “I don’t want to trust anyone else’s code”. This, in my view is mostly bogus. If you don’t trust others to write your crypto, then you’ve got some pretty big problems on your hands…
    • You’re likely to be using some pretty heavyweight stuff like SSL and/or X.509, and reimplementing those is a seriously major job. Are you really going to do that?
    • Unless you are also a cryptographer, then you’re trusting the guys that designed the crypto you’re implementing anyway.
    • Ditto protocol desginer.
  • Languages: an implementation in Java isn’t going to work so well in Python. And although its true that you can plug C implementations into almost everything, there are legitimate and not-so-legitimate reasons for not wanting to do so…
    • You don’t trust native code: see above.
    • It makes your distribution hard to build and/or use and tricky to install.
    • You are running on a platform that doesn’t allow native code, for example, a web hosting company, or Google’s App Engine.
    • Native code has buffer overflows and MyFavouriteLanguage doesn’t: true, but probably the least of your worries, given all the other things that you can get wrong, at least if the native code is widely used and well tested.
  • Efficiency: you are not in the long tail of users who’s transactions per second is measured in fractions. In this case, you may well want specialised implementations that exploit every ounce of power in your platform.

Of these, reimplementation for efficiency clearly needs a completely hand-crafted effort. Trust issues are, in my view, largely bogus, but if you really want to go that way, be my guest. So what does that leave? People who want it in their chosen language, are quite happy to have someone else implement it and are not in need of the most efficient implementation ever. However, they would like correctness!

This line of thinking let me spend the weekend implementing a prototype of a language I call “Stupid”. The idea is to create a language that will permit the details of cryptography and cryptographic protocols to be specified unambiguously, down to the bits and bytes, and then compile that language into the language of your choice. Because we want absolute clarity, Stupid does not want to be like advanced languages, like OCaml and Haskell, or even C, where there’s all sorts of implicit type conversions and undefined behaviour going on – it wants it to be crystal clear to the programmer (or reviewer) exactly what is happening at every stage. This also aids the process of compiling into the target language, of course. So, the size of everything wants to be measured in bits, not vague things like “long” or “size_t”. Bits need to be in known places (for example, big-endian). Operations need to take known inputs and produce known outputs. Sign extension and the like do not want to happen magically. Overflow and underflow should be errors, unless you specifically stated that they were not, and so on.

To that end, I wrote just enough compiler to take as input a strawman Stupid grammar sufficient to do SHA-256, and produce various languages as output, in order to get a feel for what such a language might look like, and how hard it would be to implement.

The result is: you can do something rough in a weekend :-)

Very rough – but it seems clear to me that proceeding down this road with more care would be very useful indeed. We could write all the cryptographic primitives in Stupid, write relatively simple language plugins for each target language and we’d have substantially improved the crypto world. So, without further ado, what does my proto-Stupid look like? Well, here’s SHA-256, slightly simplified (it only processes one block, I was going cross-eyed before I got round to multiple blocks). Note, I haven’t tested this yet, but I am confident that it implements (or can be easily extended to implement) everything needed to make it work – and the C output the first language plugin produces builds just fine with gcc -Wall -Werror. I will test it soon, and generate another language, just to prove the point. In case the code makes your eyes glaze over, see below for some comments on it…

"This code adapted from Wikipedia pseudocode";

"Note 2: All constants in this pseudo code are in big endian";

"Initialize variables";
"(first 32 bits of the fractional parts of the square roots of the first 8 primes 2..19):";
uint32 h0 = 0x6a09e667;
uint32 h1 = 0xbb67ae85;
uint32 h2 = 0x3c6ef372;
uint32 h3 = 0xa54ff53a;
uint32 h4 = 0x510e527f;
uint32 h5 = 0x9b05688c;
uint32 h6 = 0x1f83d9ab;
uint32 h7 = 0x5be0cd19;

"Initialize table of round constants";
"(first 32 bits of the fractional parts of the cube roots of the first 64 primes 2..311):";
array(uint32, 64) k =
(0x428a2f98, 0x71374491, 0xb5c0fbcf, 0xe9b5dba5,
0x3956c25b, 0x59f111f1, 0x923f82a4, 0xab1c5ed5,
0xd807aa98, 0x12835b01, 0x243185be, 0x550c7dc3,
0x72be5d74, 0x80deb1fe, 0x9bdc06a7, 0xc19bf174,
0xe49b69c1, 0xefbe4786, 0x0fc19dc6, 0x240ca1cc,
0x2de92c6f, 0x4a7484aa, 0x5cb0a9dc, 0x76f988da,
0x983e5152, 0xa831c66d, 0xb00327c8, 0xbf597fc7,
0xc6e00bf3, 0xd5a79147, 0x06ca6351, 0x14292967,
0x27b70a85, 0x2e1b2138, 0x4d2c6dfc, 0x53380d13,
0x650a7354, 0x766a0abb, 0x81c2c92e, 0x92722c85,
0xa2bfe8a1, 0xa81a664b, 0xc24b8b70, 0xc76c51a3,
0xd192e819, 0xd6990624, 0xf40e3585, 0x106aa070,
0x19a4c116, 0x1e376c08, 0x2748774c, 0x34b0bcb5,
0x391c0cb3, 0x4ed8aa4a, 0x5b9cca4f, 0x682e6ff3,
0x748f82ee, 0x78a5636f, 0x84c87814, 0x8cc70208,
0x90befffa, 0xa4506ceb, 0xbef9a3f7, 0xc67178f2);

"For now, dummy in the message instead of declaring a function wrapper";
"Also, for now, allow enough room in the input for padding, etc, to simplify the loop";
uint32 message_bits = 123;
array(uint8, 64) message =
(0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0,
0x0f, 0xed, 0xcb, 0xa9, 0x87, 0x65, 0x43, 0x21);
uint32 pad_byte = 0;
uint32 pad_bit = 0;
uint32 tmp = 0;
uint32 tmp2 = 0;
array(uint32, 16) w = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
uint32 i = 0;
uint32 s0 = 0;
uint32 s1 = 0;
uint32 a = 0;
uint32 b = 0;
uint32 c = 0;
uint32 d = 0;
uint32 e = 0;
uint32 f = 0;
uint32 g = 0;
uint32 h = 0;
uint32 maj = 0;
uint32 t1 = 0;
uint32 t2 = 0;
uint32 ch = 0;

"Pre-processing:";
"append the bit '1' to the message";

"note that we're using a 32-bit length for now";
"all the op32, op8 etc are _without_ wrap (where applicable) - i.e. wrap is an error";
"they also require left and right to both be the correct type and size";
"also, we have no precedence, it is up to you to bracket things";
"rshift is with zero padding";

pad_bit = 7 minus32 (message_bits mod32 8);
pad_byte = (message_bits plus32 1) rshift32 8;
message[pad_byte] = message[pad_byte] or8 (1 lshift8 pad_bit);

"append k bits '0', where k is the minimum number >= 0 such that the
resulting message length (in bits) is congruent to 448 (mod 512)";

"eq32 and friends return a boolean value (which is not even a bit)";

if (pad_bit eq32 0) {
pad_bit = 7;
pad_byte = pad_byte plus32 1;
} else {
pad_bit = pad_bit minus32 1;
}

"bor is like C || (i.e. RHS is only executed if LHS is false)";

"448/8 = 56";
while (((pad_byte mod32 512) ne32 56) bor (pad_bit ne32 7)) {
message[pad_byte] = message[pad_byte] and8 (not8 (1 lshift8 pad_bit));
if (pad_bit eq32 0) {
pad_bit = 7;
pad_byte = pad_byte plus32 1;
} else {
pad_bit = pad_bit minus32 1;
}
}

"append length of message (before pre-processing), in bits, as 64-bit big-endian integer";

message[pad_byte] = 0;
message[pad_byte plus32 1] = 0;
message[pad_byte plus32 2] = 0;
message[pad_byte plus32 3] = 0;

message[pad_byte plus32 7] = mask32to8 message_bits;
tmp = message_bits rshift32 8;
message[pad_byte plus32 6] = mask32to8 message_bits;
tmp = message_bits rshift32 8;
message[pad_byte plus32 5] = mask32to8 message_bits;
tmp = message_bits rshift32 8;
message[pad_byte plus32 4] = mask32to8 message_bits;

"for each chunk (we only have one, so don't bother with the loop for now)";

" break chunk into sixteen 32-bit big-endian words w[0..15]";
tmp = 0;
while(tmp ne32 16) {
tmp2 = tmp lshift32 2;
w[tmp] = ((widen8to32 message[tmp2]) lshift32 24)
plus32 ((widen8to32 message[tmp2 plus32 1]) lshift32 16)
plus32 ((widen8to32 message[tmp2 plus32 2]) lshift32 8)
plus32 (widen8to32 message[tmp2 plus32 3]);
tmp = tmp plus32 1;
}

" Extend the sixteen 32-bit words into sixty-four 32-bit words";
i = 16;
while(i ne32 64) {
s0 = (w[i minus32 15] rrotate32 7) xor32 (w[i minus32 15] rrotate32 18) xor32 (w[i minus32 15] rshift32 3);
s1 = (w[i minus32 2] rrotate32 17) xor32 (w[i minus32 2] rrotate32 19) xor32 (w[i minus32 2] rshift32 10);
w[i] = w[i minus32 16] plus32 s0 plus32 w[i minus32 7] plus32 s1;
}

" Initialize hash value for this chunk:";

a = h0;
b = h1;
c = h2;
d = h3;
e = h4;
f = h5;
g = h6;
h = h7;

" Main loop:";

i = 0;
while(i ne32 64) {
s0 = (a rrotate32 2) xor32 (a rrotate32 13) xor32 (a rrotate32 22);
maj = (a and32 b) xor32 (a and32 c) xor32 (b and32 c);
t2 = s0 plus32 maj;
s1 = (e rrotate32 6) xor32 (e rrotate32 11) xor32 (e rrotate32 25);
ch = (e and32 f) xor32 ((not32 e) and32 g);
t1 = h plus32 s1 plus32 ch plus32 k[i] plus32 w[i];
h = g;
g = f;
f = e;
e = d plus32 t1;
d = c;
c = b;
b = a;
a = t1 plus32 t2;
}

" Add this chunk's hash to result so far:";

h0 = h0 plus32 a;
h1 = h1 plus32 b;
h2 = h2 plus32 c;
h3 = h3 plus32 d;
h4 = h4 plus32 e;
h5 = h5 plus32 f;
h6 = h6 plus32 g;
h7 = h7 plus32 h;

"end of outer loop (when we do it)";

"Obviously I can also do this part, but right now I am going cross-eyed";
"Produce the final hash value (big-endian):
digest = hash = h0 append h1 append h2 append h3 append h4 append h5 append h6 append h7";

Notice that every operator specifies the input and output sizes. For example plus32 means add two 32-bit numbers to get a 32-bit result, with wrap being an error (this probably means, by the way, that the last few plus32s should be plus32_with_overflow, since SHA-256 actually expects overflow for these operations). So far we only deal with unsigned quantities; some “overflows” are actually expected when dealing with negative numbers, so that would have to be specified differently. Also, I didn’t deal with the size of constants, because I wasn’t sure about a good notation, though I am leaning towards 23_8 to mean an 8-bit representation of 23 (subscripted, like in TeX).

Because Stupid really is stupid, it should be very easy to write static analysis code for it, enabling checks to be omitted sometimes – for example, the fact that we only subtract 1 from pad_bit if pad_bit is non-zero means that we would not have to check for underflow in that case.

Anyway, I’m a bit bemused after writing a lot of rather repetitive code for the compiler, so I think I’ll wait for reactions before commenting further – but it does seem to me that this is a project worth pursuing. The compiler itself, whilst somewhat crude, particularly since it doesn’t yet do most of the checks I suggest should be there, is pretty small and easily understood: less than 1,500 lines of Perl and YAPP. I won’t bore you with the details, but if you want a peek, here’s a tarball.

19 Jan 2010

Debugging for Caja

Filed under: Caja, Capabilities, Programming, Security — Ben @ 15:28

One of the hardest parts about using Caja (which, by the way, is now far and away the most successful capability project ever) is debugging. Because of the transforms Caja must do to render your code safe, even something simple like

x.a = y.b + z.c();

becomes

$v.s($v.ro(‘x’), ‘a’, $v.r($v.ro(‘y’), ‘b’) + $v.cm($v.ro(‘z’), ‘c’, [ ]));

if we ignore all the wrapping code that is generated. Whilst you can certainly get used to reading this and translating it back into your original source in your head, so you can use, say, Firebug to debug, it’s pretty painful at best.

So I was pleased to see that the Closure Inspector now supports Caja debugging.

By the way, if you want to play with Caja, it’s now easier than ever, using the new Appspot-based Caja Playground.

13 Jan 2010

Is SSL Enough?

Filed under: Crypto, Open Standards, Security — Ben @ 21:16

In response to my post on OAuth WRAP, John Panzer asks

[A]re you arguing that we shouldn’t rely on SSL? OAuth WRAP (and for that matter, OAuth 1.0 PLAINTEXT) rely on SSL to mitigate the attacks mentioned. Ben Adida’s argument is that SSL libraries won’t save you because people can misconfigure and misuse the libraries. But OAuth libraries will save you; apparently they can’t be misconfigured. There seems to be a small contradiction here. Especially since OAuth is much less mature than SSL.

I am not saying we shouldn’t rely on SSL, and I am not arguing that SSL libraries won’t save you (though it’s pretty clear that they are often misused – in particular, failure to check that the certificate presented corresponds to the server you were trying to connect to is a fantastically common error, it seems – in other words, SSL is often used in a mode that gives no protection against a man-in-the-middle). What I am saying is that when you design a security protocol, you should design something that addresses the appropriate threat model. Now, I am not aware of a published threat model for OAuth WRAP, so I instead apply the one I have in my head for authentication protocols, since that’s what it is. In my off-the-top-of-my-head model of authentication protocols there are various properties I want

  • No replays: if someone gets hold of a request, they should not be able to replay it.
  • Not malleable: if someone sees one request, they should not be able to create another correct one.
  • No credential equivalent: the server should not be able to create a request that looks like it came from the client.

And so forth. I will not create a complete set of requirements, because that’s a tough job, and it’s nearly time for supper. However, you can easily see that OAuth WRAP does not satisfy any of these requirements. Nor, incidentally, do username/password logins.

Now, you can argue that the use of SSL makes the requirements redundant, and I have some sympathy for that argument but, as we have seen, SSL can have flaws in it. And, in fact, for example, the current flaw is perfect for attacking OAuth WRAP – I could inject a request in front of your WRAP request that causes your credential to be sent to me, and now, bingo, I can do anything at all that you can do. A well designed protocol would not suffer from this issue.

But even if we ignore the weakness in SSL, there are other requirements that are not met – in particular, the “no credential equivalent” requirement is not addressed at all by SSL. The server can easily fabricate a request and claim I made it. This is a terrible property for a protocol that is supposed to be used to protect my assets.

So, in short, I agree that you can use SSL to make a crappy protocol less crappy. But the right thing to do is to figure out what your requirements are (really, not fudge them so they fit your protocol, as I rather suspect will happen here) and then design a protocol that satisfies them. If that protocol happens to be “password over SSL” then great, you’re home and dry. But I do not see how any modern, well-designed authentication protocol could be that way.

8 Jan 2010

TLS Renegotiation Fix: Nearly There

Filed under: Crypto, General, Open Source, Open Standards, Security — Ben @ 13:19

Finally, after a lot of discussion, the IESG have approved the latest draft of the TLS renegotation fix. It is possible it’ll still change before an RFC number is assigned, but it seems unlikely to me.

But that doesn’t mean there isn’t plenty of work left to do. Now everyone has to implement it (in fact, many have already done so, including tracking the various changes as the I-D was updated), interop test with each other and roll out to clients and servers. And even then it isn’t over, since until clients are (mostly) universally updated, servers will have to allow old clients to connect and clients may have to be prepared to connect to old servers. In the case of a new server and an old client, it doesn’t hugely matter that the client has not been updated because it is defended by the server, which should not allow a renegotiation to occur if the client is old. However, in the case of an old server and a new client, or an old server and an old client, then there’s a problem – the client could be attacked. Obviously a new client can detect it is talking to an old server, and decline to play, but for some transitional period, it seems likely that clients will have to tolerate this, perhaps warning their user.

We could summarise the situation like this:

Client
Old New
Server Old vulnerable vulnerable but client is aware, client should decline or at least warn
New not vulnerable if renegotiation is forbidden, client is unaware not vulnerable, everyone is aware
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