Chowder isn’t exactly rocket science, but this went pretty well, so documenting it here…
I actually made this almost entirely from frozen ingredients and it was just fine. Fresh might be better.
Finely chopped leek
Smoked bacon, sliced (I used some lardons I had in the freezer)
Chicken stock (maybe fish stock would be better, I didn’t have any) or water
Milk (about half as much as stock)
Fry the leeks and bacon in a little butter/olive oil (I used both) until pretty soft – I didn’t crisp the bacon for a change. I think it is better for chowder not to. Add cubed potatoes and fry for a bit longer, then add chicken stock (or water or fish stock) and bring to the boil. Simmer until the potatoes have softened, then zap half the mixture with a blender (I just did this in situ). Season (I didn’t need salt, there was enough in the bacon). Add milk, fish, prawns and bring back up to a simmer, cook for a few minutes, making sure the fish falls apart. Add cooked sweetcorn and bring back up to temperature. Finally, add some cream.
Quantities should be chosen so that the final result is good and thick.
Serve with warm, crusty bread and butter. Works as a whole meal.
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I do not represent my employer in this post.
Eric Schmidt allegedly said
“The only way to manage this is true transparency and no anonymity. In a world of asynchronous threats, it is too dangerous for there not to be some way to identify you. We need a [verified] name service for people. Governments will demand it.”
I don’t care whether he actually said it, but it neatly illustrates my point. The trouble with allowing policy makers, CEOs and journalists define technical solutions is that their ability to do so is constrained by their limited understanding of the available technologies. At Google (who I emphatically do not represent in this post), we have this idea that engineers should design the systems they work on. I approve of this idea, so, speaking as a practising engineer in the field of blame (also known as security), I contend that what Eric really should have allegedly said was that the only way to manage this is true ability to blame. When something goes wrong, we should be able to track down the culprit. Governments will demand it.
Imagine if, the next time you got on a plane, instead of showing your passport, you instead handed over an envelope with a fancy seal on it, containing your ID, with windows showing just enough to get you on the plane (e.g. your ticket number and photo). The envelope could be opened on the order of a competent court, should it turn out you did something naughty whilst travelling, but otherwise you would remain unidentified. Would this not achieve the true aim that Eric allegedly thinks should be solved by universal identification? And is it not, when spread to everything, a better answer?
Of course, in the physical world this is actually quite hard to pull off, tamper-proof and -evident seals being what they are (i.e. crap), but in the electronic world we can actually do it. We have the crypto.
I mentioned FreeBSD Capsicum in my roundup of capability OSes earlier this year without mentioning that I am involved in the project. Since then we’ve managed to port and sandbox Chromium, using less code than any other Chromium sandbox (100 lines), as well as a number of other applications. Also impressive, I think, is the fact that Robert Watson managed to write this sandbox in just two days, having never seen the Chromium codebase before – this is as much a testament to Robert’s coding skills and the clean Chromium codebase as it is to Capsicum, but nevertheless worth a mention.
Anyway, at USENIX Security this week, we won Best Student Paper. A PC member described the paper to me as “excellent” and “very important”. Robert has also blogged about it rather more eloquently than I can manage at this time in the morning.
You can read the paper, too, if you want.
Even more exciting, FreeBSD 9 will include the Capsicum capability framework, allowing the peaceful coexistence of capability and POSIX programs. Although this has been attempted before, as far as I am aware all previous versions have put a POSIX emulation layer on top of a capability system, rather than grafting capabilities onto POSIX. Since Capsicum is highly efficient and FreeBSD is a perfectly sound and portable system (and my server OS of choice), this opens up the possibility of a gradual migration to capabilities, something that has been problem up to now.
Robert and I (and a host of others) are continuing our research into practical capability systems, Robert at Cambridge and me at Google. Work is also in progress to port Capsicum to Linux.
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